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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATIE; OF UT'AH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF
GERTRUDE LOUISE RICHARDS,
DECEASED
CATHERINE R. HOWELL,
CATHERINE S. CRESS and CHARLES
RICHARD SCHNEIDER,
Contestants and Respondents,

Case No.
8452

-vs.-

JANET R. PARKER,
Proponent and Appellant,
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
Executor.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Gertrude Louise Richards died testate in Salt Lake
City on June 30, 1954. She left a will dated the 20th day
of March, 1946, and a codicil dated June 25, 1954. Both
instruments were offered for probate in connection with
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a petition filed on July 2, 1954, by Walker Bank & Trust
Company (Tr. 1-4). Catherine R. Howell, a niece of Miss
Richards, Catherine S. Cress and Charles Richard
Schneider, a grandniece and grandnephew respectively,
filed objections to the probate of the codicil (Tr. 5-7).
On August 4, 1954, the court admitted the will to probate,
appointed Walker Bank & Trust Company as executor
"without prejudice to the admission to probate of said
purported codicil as the codicil to said will" and ordered
that the hearing and trial of the issues with respect to
the codicil be placed upon the trial calender of the court
(Tr. 8-11).
Janet R. Parker, the sole surviving sister of Miss
Richards, the principal beneficiary under the codicil,
filed her answer (Tr. 13-14) and \\Talker Bank & Trust
Cornpany filed its reply (Tr. 18-19) to the objections
1nade tQ the probate of the codicil. There was but one
factual issue subn1itted to the jury through the medium
of a special Yerdict ( Tr. 69). Six of the eight jurors
ans\\·ered that )iiss Richards, at the time of making the
codicil dated June 25, 1954, "·as not of sound and disposing 1nind. Thereafter the clerk~s judgment was enterPd on the verdict denying the codicil to probate (Tr. 7073). TJ1iR appeal is taken to reverse the finding and

judgment.
l\fiss Richards, seventy-eight years of age, was in
the Holy Cros~ Hospital in Salt Lal{e City on the date
o-f the codicil, undergoing treatment for diabetes and
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other complications under the care of Dr. John J. Galligan. Dr. Galligan testified that if Miss Richards was
not in a state of diabetic coma or in a state of insulin
shock it 'vas his opinion that she would know what she
was doing with reference to her worldy affairs (Tr. 282283) ; that a person in diabetic coma or in insulin shock
evidences a condition that would be startling to a layman
and that a lay1nan could immediately detect the condition
of shock or coma (T·r. 284). Dr. Galligan testified that
if Miss Richards, on the 25th day of June, was suffering
from diabetic acidosis or insulin shock she would be unconscious or bordering on unconsciousness and incapable
physically of "transacting" any legal document "or
\vhatever happened on that day", but if she was not in
insulin shock or in diabetic coma she could function (Tr.
285).
Joseph S. Jones, an attorney at this Bar practicing
since 1931 (Tr. 122), Oscar l(. Carlson, a Vice President
of

vValker Bank & Trust Company, and Clair M. ~~Iorten

sen, a Vice President and Trust Officer of the bank, were
present at the time that Miss Richards executed the codicil of June 25th. Mr. Jones and Mr. Carlson attested
the document as subscribing witnesses (Exhibit C-2).
~Ir.

Carlson traced his employment with the bank back

to 1920 (Tr. 123). Mr. Mortensen has been employed by
the bank in the Trust Department for more than twentyfive years ( Tr. 176). They all testified unequivocally
as to Miss Richards' mental competency at the time of
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the execution of the codicil, all to the effect that she had
a full understanding of what she was doing and was of
sound and disposing mind and memory (Tr. 104, 129,
189).
The subscribing witnesses related in minute detail
all that occurred at the time the codicil was executed,
including a conversation between Miss Richards and Mr.
Jones concerning Judge Harold Stephens, :Jfiss Richards
stating that Judge Stephens was the family lawyer for
many years and inquiring concerning :Jir. Jones' acquaintanceship with him and as to Judge Stephens' health
(Tr. 98). l\{r. Carlson had known ~Iiss Richards for
about twenty-five years as a business customer of the
bank and particularly of the investment department, the
department in ,,~hich Mr. Carlson functioned (Tr. 154).
Mr. :Thiortensen had assisted ~fiss Richards in connection
with her tax returns (Exhibit P-4).
Even l\I r~. Ho,vell, one of the eontestants, a niece of
both !fiss Richards and Mrs. Parker, testified that she
Ina de no reflection on l\Iiss Richards' Inental integrity;
that she assumed that Miss Richards was transacting
business up until the last and that she assumed that Miss
Richards could take care of her affairs (Tr. 411-412).
The unc('~:liYocal testin1onY of the bank\;;: officers and the
-

1

•

bank's attorney "Ti th respect to lfiss Richards' business
coinprt<.~ne~T is eorroborated by a revie"\Y of the inventoried
as8ets of the estate ( Tr. 20-35), "\Yhich inventory discloses
a rare aeeun1ulation of iteins such as are possessed by a
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family of long standing, of means and an appreciation
of esthetic values (Tr. 402) as well as investments generally looked upon as being those held by a prudent and
conservative investor.
On the 25th of June, during the time that Mr. Jones
was explaining the codicil to Miss Richards and before
~Iiss Richards had affixed her signature thereto, the
conference was interrupted by the interne (Dr. Copeland), who came into the hospital roo1n and said: "I
have son1ething to attend to with Miss Richards, and I
'rould like you to leave the room." Miss Richards said:
"I have some important business with these gentlemen.
I \vish that you could do that later, and I could proceed
'vith this business." Dr. Copeland replied: "No, if you
want to get well, you have got to do what I ask you to do,
and I want you to do it now." The Doctor said: "She will
be fixed up in a few minutes, and you can come back."
(Tr. 100-101). When the three men returned to the room,
about t'venty minutes later, Miss Richards was sitting
up in bed and was being fed intravenously through a
tube, similar to Exhibit C-1, affixed to her right wrist.
~rr. Jones, when he saw the tube in Miss Richards' right
\vrist, said: "Well, now, we can come back and attend
to this after * * * you have this feeding or whatever you
are receiving." 1fiss Richards said: "No, I don't want
you to come back later. I want to do this right now." (Tr.
101). Whereupon the statements with regard to the
codicil were reiterated and the mechanics of signing the
codicil and the due attestation thereof were followed
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through, Miss Richards taking some three or four minutes
to read the document and then signing it as best she could
with the intravenous apparatus attached to her right
wrist, the hand with which she signed her name (Tr. 101102) strapped with boards so the needle would not be
ejected from the vessel (Tr. 287). ~Iiss Richards was
concerned about the signature and said: "Is that a good
enough signature~" Mr. Jones assured her that it was
(Tr. 102).
The 1946 will, after making specific bequests to three
nephews, the sons of Mrs. Parker, to Mrs. Howell, to
Eleanor Richards Schneider, to :\Irs. Parker (including
the home) and to a friend, gives, by paragraph 11, onehalf of the residue to nirs. Parker, and the other half to
Mrs. Howell and Eleanor Richards Schneider, the only
children of l\fiss Richards' deceased brother, Charles
Edward Richards. Mrs. Parker was appointed executrix.
The codicil of June 25, 1954, recites the death of Eleanor
Richards Schneider and cancels paragraph 8 of the will
'vhich gave to Mrs. Schneider certain specific items. The
codicil revokes the residuary bequests contained in paragraph 11 and in lieu thereof provides for a payment of
$10,000.00 to 1\frs. Howell and $10,000.00 to the children
of l\[rs. Schneider, to be divided equally among them
( Catherille ~3. Cress and Charles Richard Schneider).
The residue of the estate then goes to ~Irs. Parker. The
appointment of 1\Irs. Parker as execu'trix is revoked and
Walker Bank '-~ Trust Company is made executor. As
to the latter 1\liss Richards stated to ~fr. Carlson that,
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while she had originally appointed Mrs. Parker to act as
executrix, she considered this an honorary' appointment
and because of the vvork to be done in connection with
her affairs she would like to have the bank act as executor (Tr. 133).
There was some confusion at the bank and with its
attorneys before the June 25th document was finally
drafted in accordance with the instructions of Miss
Richards. The confusion was brought about by the fact
that the bank did not have the 1946 will and, as a result
of the confusion, Miss Richards signed a document on
June 22nd purporting to be a codicil but which document
\vas later destroyed as hereinafter mentioned and after
the bank secured a copy of the 1946 will. Mr. Carlson
had been instructed by Miss Richards on June 21, 1954
(Tr. 130) to prepare a codicil for Miss Richards' signature, giving to Mrs. Howell only $10,000.00 and only
$10,000.00 to the children of Eleanor Schneider ( Tr. 349)
and providing for the bank to act as executor in lieu of
her sister, Mrs. Parker. Miss Richards stated that she
had made "a terrible mistake" in her will (Tr. 133). Mr.
Carlson, without having seen the will of March 20, 1946
(Tr. 136) or knovving the provisions thereof, or that Mrs.
Parker, Mrs. Howell or the children of Eleanor Schneider
were or were not named in the will, and under the admonition of l\1iss Richards to keep her desires confidential, particularly with respect to Mrs. Parker ( Tr. 154155), initiated a course of procedure in the bank through
the medium of Wm. J. Fitzpatrick (Tr. 134-135), the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
Trust Officer, which resulted in Mr. Carlson and 1\Ir.
Athol Rawlins, an attorney for the bank, taking an instrument to Miss Richards for her signature on the 22nd
day of June (Tr. 136).
On the completion of the June 22nd instrument, Mr.
Rawlins and Mr. Carlson took the document to Miss
Richards' hospital room where she duly executed the
same with Mr. Rawlins and ~Ir. Carlson signing as the
attesting witnesses (Tr. 344-346). The June 22nd instrument was destroyed on June 26, 1954, by Mr. Carlson in
Miss Richards' presence and at her direction (Tr. 152153).
On June 23rd or during the morning of the 24th
nir. :\fortensen informed )ir. Rawlins that he had received a copy of :\Iiss Richards' will from Mrs. Parker
and that a mistake had been made in the codicil of the
22nd ( Tr. 204, 3-±9) . The effect of the codicil of the
22nd, "-hich did not contain any referenee to the residue
of the estate (Tr. 361), "\Yas to increase, contrary to Miss
Richards' instructions, the bequests to l\Irs. Howell and
to the children of )Irs. Schneider (Tr. 350). l\Ir. Mortensen then handed a forn1 of codicil to l\Ir. Rawlins
\\Thich 1nade reference to the "-ill of !larch 20, 1946 (Tr.
350). rri12l'<?"llpon ::\fr. Ra"\Ylins took the draft and made
son1e corrections ( Tr. 351). This 'vas essentially the
~a1110 as the June 25th docu1uent (Tr. 352). ~Ir. Raw·lins
and 1\f r. Carlson took the new instrun1ent to the hospital
on June 24th (Tr. 352), explained to Miss

~ichards
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a mistake had been 1nade in the codicil executed the previous Tuesday (June 22nd) and explained the provisions
of the new document ( Tr. 353-354).
Mr. Rawlins could get no response from Miss Richards when he asked her to close her fingers on the pen
that he attempted to get her to hold for the purpose of
signing the document, and concluded that she did not
kno\v what he \vas telling her when he said: "Close your
fingers." (Tr. 356). Mr. Rawlins thought that Miss
Richards' condition was temporary and due to something that had happened that morning, particularly a
bath that she was having when he first appeared (Tr.
359). I\1r. Rawlins and Mr. Carlson then left the hospital
but before leaving they asked the nurse to call the bank
w·hen Miss Richards felt better, the nurse stating that
1\Iiss Richards usually felt better in the afternoon (Tr.
357).
The next day, at the time of the execution of the
June 25th codicil, 1"Ir. Jones asked Miss Richards if she
desired all of the residue of her property to go to Mrs.
Parker and 11iss Richards answered "Yes." (Tr. 186).
On June 26th, when the June 22nd instrument -vvas destroyed, Miss Richards was "very" alert and seemed
"quite relaxed." (Tr. 161). She talked about the disposition of the first codicil and about Mr. Carlson's family
and his -vvife's health. She expressed the feeling that she
was very glad that her business had been concluded. "I
feel much better now, and I can feel more peaceful." (Tr.
162-163).
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Miss Richards, during her stay in the hospital, was
suffering, in addition to diabetes, from a chronic heart
disease (Tr. 227), a physical "senility" (Tr. 230) and
hardening of the arteries "as we would expect in almost
anyone her age" (Tr. 228). Dr. Copeland, an interne at
Holy Cross caring for Miss Richards under Dr. Galligan's direction, testified that when he first saw Miss
Richards she was rational, in contact with reality, oriented as to time, person and place, knew where she was,
the approximate time of day and knew what she was in
the hospital for (Tr. 229-230). Dr. Copeland also testified that when he injected the needle into Miss Richards'
wrist for the intravenous feeding on June 25th niiss
Richards was oriented, was not in insulin shock or in a
diabetic coma (Tr. 257-258).
Dr. L. M. Currier, a physician specializing in psychiatry (Tr. 306), was pern1itted, over objections, to testify
hypothetically to the effect that an enlarged heart is an
inefficient heart; that "one would expect that it might
have some influence on the clarity of thinking" (Tr. 313) ;
that he "would expect" that a person between diabetic
acidosis and insulin shock would probably be in some
state of confusion and perhaps disorientation "at least
some of the ti1ne." (Tr. 318). He testified that it would
see1n ''hig·hly unlikely· that a person in this 1uedical situation 'vould be in a state of Inind to n1ake any decision of
lasting- or serious iinportance." (Tr. 319). Among other
th i.ngs, and over objection, Dr. (~urrier "~as pernritted to
injeet. n11 acadeinic definition of usenility~' as applying
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to a mental condition ( Tr. 308-309) in direct contradiction of contestants' own witness, Dr. Copeland, who testified that he used the term "senility" to imply the failing
of physical condition generally (Tr. 230).
The hypothetical questions propounded to Dr. Currier were objected to on the grounds, among others, that
they misstated and distorted the record and that there
was no proper foundation (Tr. 317). Motions were made
to strike based upon the grounds that the testimony had
no probative value and stated merely conjecture, uncertainty and speculation (Tr. 319). Dr. Currier speculated
upon Miss Richards' mental condition without having
seen or treated her ( Tr. 334-335) and indulged in suppositions not warranted by the record and not limited to
the situation as it existed when the codicil was executed
by Miss Richards on June 25th. Dr. Currier's testimony
is challenged by this appeal.
The case was submitted to the jury without any
instruction whatsoever as to the burden of proof. Over
objection (Tr. 424) the contestants were permitted the
right to open and close the argument to the jury, and the
absence of an instruction as to who had the burden of
proof was made a matter of exception to the court's instructions (Tr. 434-435).
\Vhile the amended pretrial order stated three factual issues to be determined, (1) whether Miss Richards
signed the codicil, ( 2) whether Miss Richards had the
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requisite capacity to make the codicil, assuming that she
signed it, and (3) whether the codicil executed by Miss
Richards was of her own free will or was in fact executed
because of undue influence exercised upon her by Janet
R. Parker (Tr. 15-17), the court submitted only the second is sue to the jury.
Upon this appeal it is contended that there is no
competent evidence in the record to support the finding
to the effect that Miss Richards did not have the requisite testamentary capacity to execute the codicil, but that
on the contrary the evidence affirmatively shows, without
contradiction, that ~!iss Richards "\Yas competent to make
the codicil of June 25, 1954.

STATE:JIEKT OF POINTS
POINT 1.
THE HOSPITAL RECORDS WERE HEARSAY AND NO
PROPER FOUNDATION WAS LAID FOR THEIR ADMISSIBILITY.

POINT 2.
DR. CURRIER WAS PERMITTED OVER OBJECTION
AND WITHOUT ANY BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE TO STATE
THAT MISS RI·CHARDS WAS AFFLICTED WITH A MENTAL "SENILITYn.

POINT 3.
THE TESTIMONY OF DR. CURRIER CONSISTED OF
MERE ABSTRACTIONS. THE HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED TO Hil\I WERE NOT BASED ON THE
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STATE OF MISS RICHARDS' PHYSICAL OR MENTAL
HEALTH AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTION OF THE
CODICIL AND THE EVIDENCE SO ADDUCED SHOULD
HAVE BEEN STRICKEN.

POINT 4.
THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DR. CURRIER WAS
UNDULY RESTRICTED.

POINT 5.
THE CONTESTANTS HAD THE BURDEN TO SHOW
INCOMPETENCY AND THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN
SO INSTRUCTED.

POINT 6
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
JURY'S FINDING. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE
ADMITTED THE CODICIL TO PROBATE NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.
ARGU~1:ENT

POINT 1.
THE HOSPITAL RECORDS WERE HEARSAY AND NO
PROPER FOUNDATION WAS LAID FOR THEIR ADMISSIBILITY.

The hospital records, Exhibit C-3, were received in
evidence over objection ( Tr. 262). The records were
identified by 11iss \ 7 an Alstine, the medical record
librarian, who was permitted to say that they were kept
in the ordinary course of business in the hospital (Tr.
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210-211), but on a voir dire examination the witness
testified that the file was made up from a number of
different sources with markings of nurses and trainees
who the witness had no way of knowing as being presently at the hospital or who were even graduate nurses
(Tr. 213-214). The witness also testified that others
than graduate nurses had access to the file and that she
had no way of knowing whether anyone would be qualified to say what the instrument or the document purported to say (Tr. 214); that as custodian she did not
have anything to do with the file until after Miss
Richards' death (Tr. 218-219).
In the absence of statute the general rule is that
hospital records are not admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule. See W·ignz.ore on Evidence,
3rd Edition, ';rol. ''I, Section 1707. "rigmore criticizes
the rule but, nevertheless, says : ~'K o Court seems yet
to have sanctioned such an exception on common law
principles."
We are not unmindful of the expressions of this
Court in Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 96 Utah 331, 85 P. 2d 819, 120 _.A.• L.R. 1117, and
the annotation which follo\\"'S on page 1124 of 120 A.L.R.
The question in the Clayton case "Tas w·hether the respondent had a diseased appendix at the time of the accident
and, if so, did the disease contribute to the disability
and bar recovery. The appellant in the case assigned
as error the refusal to adn1it in evidence the hospital

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
records which were identified only by Dr. Albaugh, the
attending physician. This Court did not find error in
the refusal to receive the hospital records. After calling
attention to the efforts made to identify the record,
the Court said :
"None of the cases *** cited as supporting
admissibility of hospital records go so far as
appellant would have us go in this case. Before
such records can be admitted, in the absence of a
statute, the offering party must show the necessity of admitting the records without requiring
the person or several persons who made the
records to testify. He must then show the custody
from which the records were taken and that they
vvere prepared in the due course of hospital work.''
The suggestion fron1 the above quotation to the effect
that hospital records might be admissible upon a
showing that they were kept in due course of hospital
work is, we believe, dictum. The Clayton case is cited
in State v. Davie, ____________ utah ____________ , 240 P. 2d 263, but
only to call attention to the cases cited therein, the Davie
case having to do with records of a telephone company,
a power and light company and an insurance agent,
which records were permitted under the "shop book"
and "regular entry" rules.
We do not believe that this Court has directly held
hospital records to be admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule. The Court in the Clayton case said:
"This seems an appropriate subject for legislative consideration, but in the silence of our
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legislature common law principles must be applied."
In the instant case the trial court withheld its ruling
on the exhibit (Tr. 222) and perfunctorily admitted the
exhibit on the cross-examination of Dr. Copeland.

"Q. Does your chart indicate that Miss Richards
was given sedation on the 25th of June~
A.

It \Vould be in the nurses' notes, which we
have.
:)(: * :)(:

Q. Is there any
A.

sedation~

I can refer to them and let ~~ou kno\Y. At what
time~ Any time during the 25th.

Q. Any time during the 25th.
THE COURT: Since the "Witness is about
to testify, not from his memory but from the
exhibit, I suppose I ought to rule on that
offer, and the exhibit "\\ill be received in evidence. That is Exhibit C-3.
MR. GUSTIN: Does it show it is received over our objection~
THE COURT: Yes.
A.

In the n1orning. See, this starts at 1nidnight.
At t\\. .0 A.:JI. in the 1norning she received
sodiun1 lu1ninaL \Yhich is a sedatiYe.

(By Mr. Gustin) Is that the business that I
might call,a sleeping pill f
A. This ~ grain~ of llnninal 'Yould not be as
strong as the usual sleeping pill that you
r(\fer to, but it is definitely a sedative." (Tr.
262).
Q.
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Dr. Copeland on his direct exan1ination was permitted to refresh his recollection fron1 various pages of
Exhibit C-3, particularly 17 through 23 (Tr. 229-240).
The question asked Dr. Copeland concerning the sedatives that 1fiss Richards had received at 2 :00 A.M. on the
morning of June 25th was proper cross-examination
regardless of the source of the Doctor's knowledge of
the sedation, because he testified that when he made
his progress report as of 8 :00 or 9 :00 o'clock in the
morning of June 25th he noted "a stuperous condition"
(Tr. 258). It is submitted that the cross-examination on
the question of sedation did not waive the objection to
the hospital reoords, nor did it further identify the same
for their admissibility in evidence. So the question remains whether the hospital records are admissible and,
if so, whether a proper foundation has been laid. The
entire file C-3 went before the jury without being
authenticated except as to possible signatures of Dr.
Galligan and Dr. Copeland. The prejudical effect of
improper hospital records is obvious and, in fact, is ruled
to be so by the cases cited in 120 A.L.R. 1136, an annotation following the Clayton case.

POINT 2.
DR. CURRIER WAS PERMITTED OVER OBJECTION
AND WITHOUT ANY BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE TO ST'ATE
THAT MISS RI·CHARDS WAS AFFLICTED WITH A MENTAL "SENILITY''.

Page 2 of Exhibit C-3 is in the handwriting of Dr.
Copeland (Tr. 224) and purports to be a case history of
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Miss Richards written upon her admission to the hospital
on May 21, 1954. On this page appears the expression:
"She is senile and difficult to manage on out patient
basis." Dr. Copeland testified:
"A. We don't find anything with respect to senility on examination. That is just an observation. I use the term, 'senility,' to imply old
age and failing of physical condition generally. This has a connotation of both physical and mental senility. In this regard I
meant to imply from the word 'senile' just
failure of her physical being." (Tr. 230).
Dr. Currier, the phychiatrist, over objection, was permitted to inject the following:

"Q. Doctor Currier, will you tell us "~hat senility
means?
MR. Gl~STIX: :Now, if the Court please,
that "~as gone into yesterday "ith counsel's
own "~·itness. He couldn~t impeach that ,,-itness, Doctor Copeland.
1fR. BAGLEY: I have no intention of
impeaching the-attempting to.
THE COURT: I think he may have this
'vitness to explain it if he 'vishes and I suppose \vouldn't be bound. If he thought the
testimonv of so1nebodv else "~asn't the truth,
he could give additional testimony. He
couldn't impeach to sho'"" that witness "Tas
nn,vorth~~ of belief, but I think he can offer
Pvidenee. That objection1tR. G1TSTIX: ''re 1nake the further
objeetion, Your Honor~ that it isn't-it doesn't
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tend to prove nor disprove anything in this
case. It isn't directed to any issue in this
case. It is a generalized statement. It is
theory. We might be here a long time listening to this kind of discourse. The question
is not directed to anything having to do with
Miss Richards.
THE COURT: There is some testimony
that the word was used. The doctor who
wrote the word explained the meaning for
it, but I will let the witness answer. I'm not
sure just "\vhat counsel is after. Go ahead and
tell what senility is, Doctor.
A. All right, sir. Senility is a mental condition
which is characteristic of the latter decades
of life-we usually say people between sixty
and eighty years of age-which is characterized by intellectual deterioration, that is, loss
in thinking and reasoning power, with particular reference to losses of recent memory
and with frequently various states of confusion.
* * *
1\tiR. GUSTIN: We move to strike the
statement .of the witness to this time in
answer to the last question on the ground
that it is wliolly immaterial and irrelevant
to any issue in this case ; and we call Your
Honor's attention to the fact that Doctor
Copeland, who knew Miss Richards and who
examined her, testified to a physical and not
a mental senility.
THE COURT : The motion is denied.
You may go ahead, Mr. Bagley." (Tr. 307309).
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Dr. Currier was permitted to inject the idea of intellectual deterioration, loss in thinking and reasoning
power and losses of recent memory without having seen
Miss Richards (Tr. 334). Currier was able to cloud the
issue without any observation or objective finding of
his own. It is difficult to conceive of a more damaging
statement in the presence of a jury on the issue of
mental competency of the deceased. Dr. Currier could
not be cross-examined on an academic definition of a
term. The assertion of mental senility was wholly disconnected with

~1iss

Richards as a personality and yet

to a jury it had the sanction of the court as a meaningful statement of evidentiary value as applied to the
factual inquiry.
The trial court recklessly permitted Dr. Currier's
abstractions notwithstanding Dr. Copeland's positive
testilnony as to hoY\T he used the term ,,-hen he wrote it,
and notwithstanding the fact that the court's attention
was directly called to Dr. Copeland ~s testin1ony that he
'vas testifying to a matter of physical and not a mental
senility. It is conceivable that a physciatrist eould testify
as to his own observation, haYing seen and examined
the patient, hut it i~ inconceiy·able, under even the most
libPral of judicial inquiries, that
p~yehiatrist

one~

"\Yhether he be a

or not, could ilnpose upon the trier of the

fnet a 1neaning of a "-ord that the person using it did
not in tend and a connotation that "\Yas expressly dis-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
claimed when the word was used. Dr. Copeland and Dr.
Currier were both called as witnesses for the contestants.
Dr. Currier reflected upon the integrity of Dr.
Copeland's testimony and at the same time made a vicious and unwarranted statement not supported by anything in the record, and which the court refused to strike
after being advised of the full purport of the same. The
situation with Dr. Currier goes beyond the impeachment
and contradiction of Dr.· Copeland. It stands out as a
brazen ~isregard of the record and as holding out to a
jury as worthy of its consideration the theories, speculation and abstractions of a phychiatrist on the state of
mind of an individual who he, the psychiatrist, has never
seen or treated. If this conduct is to be condoned it
opens up a new field for psychiatric speculation in the
trial of cases.
I

Dr. Currier was not asked to express his opinion on
anything that Miss Richards was alleged to have said
or to have done. He was permitted, by mere assertion,
to impute to her a state of mental senility. The interrogation, withhout any reference to any alleged factual
premise, started with the bold question: "Dr. Currier,
·will you tell us what senility means~" Dr. Copeland had
already told the jury the meaning of the term "senility"
as he used it; that he meant it "as failure of her physical
being" and that the expression was the result of his own
observation or opinion. Dr. Currier was permitted to
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indelibly stamp 1\Iiss Richards, in the minds of the jury,
with the odium of mental senility by a distortion of the
observation made by Dr. Copeland and in direct contradiction to the term "senility" as Dr. Copeland used
it. The prejudical effect of this one facet of Dr. Currier's
testimony is readily apparent.
In McMinis v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., (Pa.),
135 A. 722, it is said:
"A medical expert may testify as to the
symptoms and sensations narrated by the patient,
for the purpose of securing a correct diagnosis
(Eby v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 258 Pa. 525, 102 A.
209; Boyle v. P.R. T. Co., 286 Pa. 537, 134 A. 446),
and is permitted to give his professional judgment as to effects produced by an accident, based
on his o"rn physical examination of the injured
party (Brown v. Chester Traction Co., 230 Pa.
498, 79 .A..• 713), but not on 'vhat others have told
hi1n, even though fully advised as to the history
of the ease ("\Yillian1s v. P. R. T. Co., :257 Pa. 354,
101 A. 748; Becker v. P. R. T. Co., 2±5 Pa. 462,
91 A. 861). The 'ritness cannot found his opinion
1nerely- on facts communicated, and the statelnents heard in court. Ho"~arth v. Adams Express
(~o., 269 Pa. 2SO, 112 ~-\.. 536. If he has listened
to all of the evidence submitted to the jury, where
not conflicting, he Ina~~ express his judgn1ent. Gillman v. Media Ry., 224 Pa. 267, 73 A. 342; Coyle
v. Coininon"'"ealth, 104 Pa. 117. He is not competrnt, ho,Yever, to give an opinion based only on a
part of the n1aterial evidence adduced, as attenlptPd lH_\rP, though he nu1~~ be asked as to his conclusion from consideration of specifically defined
portions of the testhnony offered. :\IeDyer v.
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Eastern Pa. Ry., 227 Pa. 641, 76 A. 841. The opinion desired should have been elicited by asking a
proper hypothetical question. Rouch v. Zehring,
59 Pa. 74; Hoy's Estate, 73 Pa. Super. Ct. 512.
In any event, where the judgment is to be based
on the testin1ony of others, the query must assume
the truth of the facts as narrated, before an opinion can be given. Williams v. P.R. T. Co., supra;
Yardley v. Cuthbertson, 108 Pa. 395; 1 A. 765;
Wissinger v. Valley Smokeless Coal Co., 271 Pa.
566, 115 A. 880; Howarth v. Adams Express Co.,
supra. The expert in this case was not asked to
form his judgment on a defined part of the evidence, nor to assume the truth of that portion
which he did hear. Under the circumstances disclosed, his opinion as to causal connection should
therefore have been rejected, and its admission
was prejudicial error, which makes necessary the
sustaining of the fourth and fifth assignments of
error."
Dr. Copeland made his note \vith reference to senility on page 2 of Exhibit C-3, the case history of Miss
Richards, upon her arrival at the hospital. He testified,
nevertheless, that when Miss Richards was admitted to
the hospital she was rational, in contact with reality,
oriented as to ti1ne, person and place, knew where she
was, the approximate time of day and knew what she
was in the hospital for ( Tr. 229-230), a condition corroborated by Messers. Jones, Carlson and Mortensen at
the tin1e the codicil of June 25th was executed. Dr.
Galligan, the attending physician, testified that Miss
Richards was competent when not in a diabetic coma or
insulin shock, that she knew what she was doing with
reference to her worldly affairs (Tr. 282-283) and:
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"Q.

As to the competency, Doctor, state what your
opinion was.

A.

Well, ~f I may generalize, I believe a person
is competent if they are conscious and know
the difference between right and wrong. I
think if their memory is unquestioned, if
they have the power of decision, that they
have definitive action in anything they do,
and also the evidence of will power, to make
decisions, (sic) that (sic) I thought ~Iiss
Richards had, except during the periods when
she was either going into coma or in insulin
shock." (Tr. 284).

There is nothing in the record from w·hich Dr. Currier can justify the conclusion of mental senility in the
sense that ~\I iss Richards had suffered intellectual
deterioration or a loss in thinking and reasoning power
sufficient to reflect upon testan1entary capacity.

POIXT 3.
THE TESTil\.IONY OF DR. CURRIER CONSISTED OF
MERE ABSTRACTIONS. THE HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED TO HIM WERE NOT BASED ON THE
STATE OF MISS RICHARDS' PHYSICAL OR MENTAL
HEALTH AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTION OF THE
·CODICIL AND THE EVIDENCE SO ADDUCED SHOULD
HAVE BEEN STRICKEN.

The hypothetical questions asked Dr. Currier 'Yere
not based on his personal observation. The questions
were predicated on isolated rircun1stanres taken fro1n the
hear8a.~ . contained in the hospital records and upon the
case history and opinions of others. Dr. Currier's testi-
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mony \vas highly conjectural, speculative and uncertain.
Substantially every answer that he gave was qualified and
upon close scrutiny will, we believe, be found to have no
probative value. The Wyoming case of In Re Nelson's
Estate, 266 P. 2d 238, at page 260, analyzes such testimony. and states that the questions propounded to the
expert should be complete and intelligible, should not
be misleading and should not be framed so as to call for
speculation or conjecture. As the trial court stated in
the Wyoming case the opinion of the doctor must be
based upon vvhat the evidence is and "should be tied
down."
Counsel, over objection, indulged in a line of questioning of which the following is an example:

"Q. You assume, Doctor, a heart in the condition
that I am about to describe. The left diaphragm is slightly elevated. A minimal
amount of pleural thickening or fluid is
present in the base of the left chest. Because
of the magnification produced by the portable technique, accurate n1easurement of the
heart cannot be made. However, the heart
appears grossly enlarged with the apex almost reaching the lateral chest wall. The
pulmonary markings are generally prominent.
The lungs are clear.
Now, Doctor, you assume a heart in that
condition. Tell us how that would affect the
supply of blood to the brain.
1\tiR. GUSTIN: Now, before you answer
that, I think that counsel will agree that his
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question is based upon a situation that is
described in the hospital reports under date
of May 24, 1954.
MR. BAGLEY: Correct
MR. GUSTIN: All right, Your Honor,
we object to the question on the ground that
it would not tend to prove nor disprove any
of the issues in this case, and it is too remote.
THE COURT : Let me ask of the witness, Doctor, do you have an opinion as to
how the patient might be affected by such a
heart~

A.

Yes sir, I do.
THE COURT: And tell me this, would
there be in your opinion any particular
change possible or likely within a period of
a month thereafter~

A.

Not in the condition of the heart, no sir.
THE COlTRT: The objection then is
overruled, and you n1ay answer the question.

A.

'Ve11,

an enlarged heart is an inefficient
heart. It doesn't pump blood as ''rell. Therefore, one would expect that there would be
some interference "\nth the integrity of the
circulation of blood throughout the systen1,
which would include the brain; and the brain
being the part of the body 1nost vulnerable
to difficulties of circulation, one u;ould
pect that it 1night have some influence on the
clarity of the thinking." (Tr. 312-313).
(Emphasis added).

ex-

The foregoing, so far as "clarityH of thinking is concerned, has absolutely no relationship to l\Iiss Richards'
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state of n1ind on June 25th, nor does it have any probative value in the face of the positive testimony of Mr.
~1ortensen and the subscribing witnesses at the time of
execution of the codicil. The above is based upon the
conclusions of others as found in the hospital reports
and case history. To permit such testimony is prejudicial and clearly erroneous. The subject is extensively
annotated at 98 A.L.R. 1109 following the case of Mt.
Royal Cab Co. v. Dolan, 179 A. 54 (Md.), 98 A.L.R. 1106,
where it is stated generally that the opinion of an expert
witness must rest upon the facts rather than upon the
opinions, inferences or conclusions of others. The annotation calls attention to the ~Iaryland case of Coughlin
v. Cuddy, 96 A. 869, where, in a will contest to determine the sanity of the testator, testimony obtained upon
a hypothetical question propounded to expert witnesses
and containing conclusions, opinions and inferences of
preceding witnesses was properly excluded, and to the
case of Mt. Royal Cab Co. v. Dolan, supra, holding that
opinions and conclusions may not be predicated upon the
opinions and conclusions of other witnesses or upon conflicting testimony that is material to the issue.
The 1955 Cumulative Supplement to Volume 20
Am. Jur., Evidence, Section 1211.1, states:
"It appears to be well settled that medical
testimony as to the possibility of a causal relation between a given accident or injury and the
subsequent death or impaired physical or mental
condition of the person injured is not sufficient,
standing alone, to establish such relation. By
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testimony as to possibility is meant testimony in
which the witness asserts that the accident or
injury 'might have,' 'may have,' or 'could have'
caused, or 'possibly did' cause the subsequent
physical condition or death or that a given physical condition (or death) 'might have,' 'may
have,' or 'could have' resulted or 'possibly did'
result from a previous accident or injury-testimony, that is, which is confined to words indicating the possibility or chance of the existence of
the causal relation in question and does not include words indicating the probability or likelihood of its existence." (En1phasis added).
Dr. Currier's ans\Yers \Vere qualified by words "one
would expect" (Tr. 313), "I would expect" (Tr. 318),
"I suppose you might say" (Tr. 318), and "it would seem
to 1ne highly unlikely" (Tr. 319). These answers and
other similar ren1arks of Dr. Currier were made the
subject of n1otions to strike and come under the rule
contended for

abo\~e,

as W'"ell as the state1nent contained

in 20 .A nl. Jur .. EYidence, Section 1206, page 1056:
"Positive expert testin1ony will prevail over
negative expert testin1ony. ~·
The !\fontana court in the rase of J:elley r. Cable

Co., 20 P. 669, held that so-ealled expert opinion has no
valu0 as against the positiYe, corroborated and uncontradicted te~tin1ony of uni1npeaehed \ritnesses to a fact.
·ThP Montana rourt said:
'•The dictates of intellectual belief are as
inlpPrious as those of conscience***."
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Objection was made to the hypothetical question which
starts at line 17 on page 314 of the record. The objection to the question is found on page 317 of the record and
was to the effect that the question would tend to contradict
and i1npeach the te~<Einiony of Dr. Galligan, who was
called as a witness for the contestants; that the question
misstates and distorts the record as to the physical condition that existed at the time of the signing of the instrument; that the question does not include the known
factors as shown by the record which makes the question incomplete, irrevelant and immaterial, and for the
further objection that a proper foundation had not been
laid for the answer. The italicized portions of the question are the portions particularly vulnerable to the objections. The question reads:

"Q.

Now, Doctor, assume that you have an unmarried female person seventy-eight years
of age with chronic arteriosclerosis or hardening of the arteries that is observable upon
pressttre of th e veins and having a heart in
the condition which I have described to you
previously and having suffered from diabetes
for a period of five or six years prior to Jun.e
25, 1954, and that this heart condition has
reached the point where it results in uncompensated heart failure; that the person is
admitted to a hospital on the 21st day of
May in a very-or very seriously ill. She
has a history of treatment of the heart by
digitalis. She, as I have stated, is suffering
also from diabetes, which is out of control,
that is, it cannot be controlled by the approved methods of treatment of diabetes by
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3tl
a skilled and experienced physician and with
all of the facilities that are available in an
ordinary hospital. Assume that the doctor
is unable to control that diabetes from the
time she entered the hospital, from May 21
up to and including the 25th of June, both of
1954; that the patient during that period that
I have described while she is in the hospital
fluctuated between diabetic acidosis and insulin shock, even though continuous attention is paid to the urinary sugar and blood
sugar. Assume further that the heart continues to deteriorate; that it results in the
presence of fluid in the lungs, which is present most of that period. Assume also that
the patient is unable to control the bowel
movements; that she is unable to eat or take
solid food except very slightly; that she grows
continuously weaker from the date of her
admission to the hospital up to and including
the 25th da~~ of June; that about a week
prior to the date of her death on June 30
there is a marked decline in her conditi.on.
All of those sympton1s that I have described
suddenly for about a' 1£eek before her death
becon~e 1nore aggra cated. and she is nauseated frequently during this stay in the hospital. She does a great deal, of vomiting. She
has to be fed intervenously~ and liquids have
to be administered intervenousl~~; that she
falls out of bed and bruises her forehead;
that she is sen.t"le.
I will ask you, Doctor-oh~ I "~ant to add
one further factor. She suffet·s front shortness of breath. and she has to have o~ryge·n
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administered to her during this stay in the
hospital. Now, she dies on the 30th day of
June.
Do you have an opinion, Doctor, as to
what the mental capacity of a person in that
condition was say on June 25, 1954~" (Tr.
314-315). (Emphasis added).
The question injects Currier's definition of senility.
There was no evidence that Miss Richards was senile
that would in any way reflect on her mental competency
on June 25th. In fact her mind was clear, she was
oriented and had a full understanding of what she was
doing and, in the words of the subscribing witnesses, she
was of sound and disposing mind and memory. In the
words of Dr. Galligan Miss Richards was competent if
not asleep or in a coma. A condition of insulin shock
or diabetic coma could have been recognized by the subscribing witnesses. Dr. Copeland would not have injected the needle for the intravenous feeding if Miss
Richards was in shock or coma, and certainly he would
not have done so if she was fluctuating between diabetic
acidosis and insulin shock. The diabetic condition was in
control at the time of the execution of the codicil otherwise the diabetic would have been in shock or com.a.
There in no evidence that at the time of the execution of
the codicil the heart had deteriorated to the point where
there was fluid in the lungs. There is no evidence that
Miss Richards at the time of the execution of the codicil
\Vas unable to control bowel movements, or that she was
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nauseated or that she was vomiting or that she was
falling out of bed or that oxygen was being administered.
These are but a few of the glaring distortions of the
record.
The question seeks to 1nake capital out of Dr. Copeland's observations and conclusions made between 8:00
and 9:00 o'clock in the morning of June 25th as reflected
in his progress report of that day; on the alleged condition of "uncompensated heart failure" and that she
"fluctuates between diabetic acidosis and insulin shock"
-mere opinions of Copeland several hours removed
fron1 the event under inquiry. The question contains
no reference to the conversation between Miss Richards
and the subscribing \Yitnesses, nor to the statement that
1\Iiss Richards made to Dr. Copeland: "I have some
important business "~ith these gentlemen, I wish that
you could do that later (the intravenous feeding) and
I rould proceed ,,~ith this business," nor to Dr. Copeland's staten1ent: "She \Yill be fixed up in a few minutes
and you can con1e back." The in1propriety of the question and its unfair and distorted prenrise is readily
di seernihle "Then one conten1plates the uncontradicted,
unilnpeached testiinony or t\\TO experienced business Inen,
a reputable la"Tyer and the patient~s attending physirian
,rhosr con1petenc:T and integrity is not questioned.
Dr. Currier's ans,rer~ and \Yhich the court refused
to strike ( Tr. 319), is characteristic of his other answers.
i I P l1as no opinion. llis O\\Tn conjecture, uncertainty and
sp<'enlation i~ rrflected by the ans\rer itself:
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"A.

•11

1.\

I suppose you might say it is like a person walking along a very treacherous narrow
pathway between a mountain precipice on
one side and a roaring river on the other
side. It is very difficult to stay on the path.
If you deviate either way a little bit, you
are likely to be in very serious trouble. ***
It would seem to me highly unlikely that a
person in this medical situation would be in
a state of mind to make any decision of lasting or serious importance." (Tr. 318-319)
(Emphasis added).

''

k

t:=J)

t tn

t-

rrr.._

·~t
W,

Well, my opinion is that she is fighting a
very difficult battle to maintain her clarity
of thinking. I would expect that a person between diabetic acidosis and insulin shock
would probably be in some state of confusion
and perhaps disorientation, at least some of
the time. How much wo~tld depend entirely
upon the severity of swings from one side to
the other, because that is what happens, with
coma being the end result on either side for
opposite reasons.

If ever there was a case where a so-called expert
arrogated to himself the function of the jury by imperious statement, not even limited by conscience, it is
the testimony of Dr. Currier in the instant matter.
~

POINT 4.
THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DR. CURRIER WAS
UNDULY RESTRICTED.

Had Dr. Currier been given the opportunity he might
have readily conceded that his theory and speculation
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were of no value objectively so far as Miss Richards
was concerned. In an attempt to test the credibility of
the witness and the extent his imperious ego prevailed,
the court erroneously, we believe, cut off that avenue of
cross-examination.

"Q. In this case do you imply that your judgment
of this situation or your opinion in any area
that you have been permitted to state your
opinion might be better than the attending
physician who knew and treated l\fiss
Richards?
MR. BAGLEY: I object to that, Your
Honor, as asking for a comparison of opinIons.
THE COlTRT: The objection is sustained, and you "\Youldn't need to weigh your
testimony against others. The jury will do
that." ( Tr. 338).
Dr. Galligan and Dr. Currier "\Yere not testif)ing on the
same level. Dr. Galligan "~as the attending physician.
Dr. Currier "~as testifying fron1 hospital charts and as
a total ~tranger to the personality of :Jiiss Riehards.
Ordinarily the la"T takes a practical, common sense view
of things and certainly cross-exan1ination is calculated
to that end. We do not haYe the orthodox situation of
asking one 'vi tness to "Teigh his testilnony as against
another. "\V.P have a very realistic and down to earth
situation of giving a 'vitness an opportunity to be fair
,vith hi1nself and 'vith the subject of the inquiry. Perhaps Dr. Currier "Tould readily have conceded that he
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was not in the same position as Dr. Galligan to pass
upon the mental fitness of Miss Richards. Perhaps he
"vould have said that his knowledge was superior to
that of Dr. Galligan and, if the latter, then the trier of
the fact might have been persuaded that such reflected
upon credibility. 'Ve submit that phychiatric testimony
has no place in this case, but if it did have a place the
trial court did not permit us to even scratch the surface on the general concept of credibility.
POINT 5.
THE CONTESTANTS HAD THE BURDEN TO SHOW
INCOMPETENCY AND THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN
SO INSTRU·CTED.

Contestants conceded that they had the burden of
showing a lack of testamentary capacity and that the
burden of proof on that issue was theirs. It was upon
that theory that the contestants were given the right
to open and close the argument (Tr. 423-424). Exceptions to the complete and total omission from the instructions given to the jury as to the burden of proof
on the issue of testamentary capacity were duly taken
(Tr. 434).

In Re Buttars' Estate,_ ___________ Utah ____________ , 261 P. 2d
171, decided in 1953 relying on In Re Hansen's Will, 50
Utah 207, 167 P. 256, held that after the testimony of
the t"-'O witnesses to the will, one of whom was the attorney who drew the same and the other his secretary,
the contestants had the burden to prove by a preponder-
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ance of evidence that the testatrix did not have a sound
and disposing mind at the time she executed the will, this
Court stating:

"By this evidence the proponents made out
a prima facie case entitling the Will to be admitted to probate and it then became incumbent
on the contestants to prove by a preponderance
of evidence that the testatrix did not have a sound
and disposing mind at the tune she executed the
Will or that she was acting under fraud, menace
or undue influence."
The codicil in the instant case "\vas offered for probate with the will of

~larch

20, 1946 (Tr. 1-4). The will

\Y'as ad1nitted 'vithout prejudice to the adrnission to probate of the codicil (Tr. 8-11). Therefore the situation is
the same as in the Buttars case and the rule announced
in Re Han sen's TVill. supra, to the effect that the burren of proof rests upon hin1 'vho makes the allegation
and he 1nust establish the fact of insanity b:~ a preponderance of the evidence.
. 1~ R
. . -6 , page n...,
. . ')Q ,
~ec t.1on bt
I n nr:.. 3 A Jn. J ur.. T r1a

. j_ IS
•
It

said:
"The parties to a ciYil action are entitled to
have the jury instructed as to the party "~ho has
the burden of proof on a specific issue raised by
the pleadings and n1aintained at the trial, and
to have the court properly define and explain
"~hat is neePf'sar~.. to sustain that burden."
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A failure to correctly i11struct the jury on the burden
of proof brought about a reversal in the case of John
Ainsfield Co. v. Rasmussen, 30 Utah 453, 85 P. 1002.
But regardless of the court's failure to instruct on
the burden of proof, particularly under what to sorne
may appear an extreme liberalizing of concepts of procedure under our new Rules of Civil Procedure, the
evidence, if any, adduced by the contestants must be
weighed consistent with the rules announced in the

Butters case and In Re Hansen's Will, which leads us to
the next point.
POINT 6
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
JURY'S FINDING. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE
ADMITTED THE CODICIL TO PROBATE NOTWITHST'ANDIND THE VERDICT.

The decisive question in this case is whether there
is any competent evidence in the record to support the
jury finding of lack of testamentary capacity. It is sub-

mitted that Dr. Currier's testimony, based as it is upon
conjecture, surmise, speculation and half truths taken
from the hospital records and the sketchy conclusions and
isolated statements of others, is no evidence at all and
should be totally disregarded. Even though the expressions of Currier be considered by this Court as
properly in the record, still there remains the question
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as to whether on the overall consideration of the entire
case reasonable minds could differ as to the integrity of
the testamentary act of the decedent.
We do not have to go so far, we believe, as to say
that Currier's testimony must be ruled out before it
can be said that a directed verdict in favor of the proponent of the codicil should have been granted, because
we say that Currier, by l1is own vacillation and lack of
responsible opinion, and not having seen !fiss Richards,
as opposed to the personal observation and uncontradicted testimony of those who were present at and witnessed the execution of the codicil, and as opposed to
the opinion of the attending physician, has no efficacy
in the record. We would, however, like to have this
Court express its disapproval of the attempt by counsel
in this and future cases to make a jury ease by injecting
son1ething as abstract and indefinable as the vagaries of
Currier.
e "~ould like it said that one operating in the
nebulous field of psychiatry can not speak authoritatively
on the strength or 'veakness of the hun1an n1ind by the contents of a bed pan. '':--e n1ust lea,~e~ ho,vever, the criticis1n
of such trial technique, if one is n1erited, to the more
nrtieulate expression. of this Court, 'vhose duty it is to
detern1ine the propt:fy of judicial inquiry and its suffieiPnr~r to place litigants in their proper relative posi-

'r

tions of right or 'vrong 'Yithin the structure of the law.

The' previous decisions of this Court have carefully
eon~ idPr('d the "~eight and sufficiency of the evidence
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whenever the integrity of a testamentary document has
been involved. In Re Lavelle's Estate,------------ Utah ____________ ,
2-!8 P. 2d 372, due allowance was made for Mrs. Lavelle's
age and poor physical condition so as to determine the
amount of influence necessary to overcome the will of
the testatrix and cited with approval In Re Bryan's
Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P. 2d 602. In both cases the
will was upheld. In the instant case an extreme and
unwarranted assertion of undue influence was made by
the pleadings but screened out by the trial court when
it became apparent that the evidence could not even
ren1otely support such assertion. We mention the undue
influence allegation as reflecting upon the weakness of
contestants' position. They even went so far as to essert that the signature on the codicil was not that of
Miss Richards. They failed to support the contention
of undue influence and the assertion that the signature
was not that of the testatrix, and as their final resort
they rely on the nebulous testimony of Dr. Currier in
their attempt to show a mental infirmity.
In the Lavelle case, Mrs. Lavelle was a bedridden
invalid, paralyzed on her left side by a series of strokes,
suffering fron1 certain kidney and urinary disorders,
at the same time sustaining an illicit relationship with
one of the benefactors of her will.

In Re Goldsberry's Estate, 95 Utah 379,81 P. 2d 1106,
'vas a case centered around alleged duress and undue
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influence. The testatrix was eighty-five years of age,
was infirm and unable to take care of herself. The Court
said:
"She was physically feeble, but alert mentally. The undue influence in this case, if any,
was applied apparently not to a weak but to a
rather strong mind."
Currier's testimony in the instant case would have us
say that physical and mental deterioration run hand ill
hand. 'l,here are 1nany elderly people who demonstrate
the fallacy of such contention whether coming from a
phychiatrist or not. Dr. Galligan testified that 1\Iiss
Richards' jllness did not affect her mental capacity.

In Re Bryan-'s Estate, supra, the contestant lost out
on both grounds of undue influence and alleged lack oftestamentary capaeity on a non-suit and dismissal.
Bryan "~as in the hospital suffering fron1 cancer and had
,iuRt undergone a 1najor operation. He wished to make
disposition of his property. H·ypodern1ics of morphine
"Trre given every four hours to relie\e pain and in the
prevention of peritonitis. It ,,~as testified that such
dosage would not rob an ordinary 1nan of his faculties
and the attending physician said that so far as he
observed it had no effect on the In ental faculties of the
patient. It "Tas held that the burden of proof is on contPstant to sho"T 1nental incapacity and undue influence
and that the proponent could 111eet this with proof of a
negative, that is, that he did not procure the execution
of t lH' "Till b~T undue influence and that the testator \vas
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not n1entally incapable. ~~ otwithstanding the operation,
the fact that the testator was in the hospital, that he was
thin and worn froin disease at the time of the execution
of the will, this Court concluded that the testator was
at the time of the making of the will of sound mind. The
scrivener was a lawyer who· went to the hospital in response to a telephone call. The Court said:
"Mr. Douglas is a lawyer of repute and many
years' experience. Not anything is made to appear that would indicate he was hostile, prejudiced, or biased. His testimony is unimpeached.
He testified he talked with Bryan for half an
hour before drawing the will, and after it was
drawn he read it to the sick man, holding the
"\vill in front of him so that he was able to follow
the reading with his eyes; that the will was read
a second time to him in the presence of the subscribing witnesses, one of whom was a nurse, and
the other the interne at the hospital. The manner
and substance of the conversation, the circumstances of the drawing and executing of the will,
strongly show that Bryan "\vas acting of his own
free will without suggestion or coercion of any
kind."
This Court in its overall conclusion held that there was
not sufficient evidence adduced by the contestant to take
the case to the jury or to support a verdict as against
the will had such a verdict been rendered.

In Re Ford's Estate, 70 Utah 456, 261 P. 15, decided
In 1927, presented both undue influence and lack of
testa1nentary capacity. This Court held that, notwithstand-
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1ng the unnatural conduct of Ford, there was no substantial evidence to sustain the verdict as far as concerned the charge that Ford at the time of the execution of his will was not of sound and disposing mind.

In Re Hansen's Will, supra, the evidence was directed almost entirely to the testator's sanity. The testator was seventy-nine years of age when the will was
made. The testimony of the scrivener and the other
subscribing witnesses respecting the mental capacity of
the testator 'vas clear and convincing. The Court held
that the inquiry as to testamentary capacity should be
limited to a period of time not too remote to the execution of the document.
In the instant case it was sho"'"ll that the disease of
diabetes works dran1atically. There is a small differ-:
ence bet"Teen the tune in ,,~hich there can be an onset
of ro1na or the adn1inistration of insulin and within the
period insulin is given, or "they get" an excess of insulin. It is a bizarre disease (Tr. 288), and a person in
diabetic con1a or insulin shock evidences a condition
that would be startling to a lay1nan and one which he
could readil~T detect (Tr. 285-286). Dr. Galligan's testinlony is that J\Iiss Richards, if not in insulin shock or in
diab0tic con1a, could function ( Tr. 285) and "Tas competent to conduct her affairs (Tr. 2S~). The inquiry, therefore, i~ ~[iss R.ichards' 1nental health at about 2:30 o'clock
on the aftrrnoon of June 25th, the time 'vhen she executed
the codieil, and at \vhich tin1e, according to the testimony
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of Messrs. Jones, C.arlson, ~{ortensen and Dr. Copeland,
she was not in diabetic coma or insulin shock, and to
this there is no dispute in the record.
In the Ii ansen case, supra, the fact that the testator
was considered unlike other men, that there were eccentricities aggravated by the physical infirmities of
being deaf, of having some ailment of the throat and
eyes, were cast aside by this Court with the expression
that "however gross" they do not constitute insanity and
cannot incapacitate one otherwise sound for making a
valid will.
In the Buttars' Estate case, supra, the will was
admitted to probate notwithstanding a jury's verdict
finding that the testatrix did not have a sound and disposing mind at the time of executing the will. This Court
held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain contestants' burden of proving lack of testamentary capacity
on the part of the testatrix at the time of making the
will. Mrs. Buttars was approximately eighty years of
age, with a history of serious and extended illness and
many idiosyncrasies. The Court held:
"The evidence related above is proof that
testatrix was eccentric in her actions and forgetful at times of some things, but is utterly insufficient to sustain the contestants' burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
she lacked testamentary capacity at the time she
executed the Will. This j s especially so in view
of the positive testimoney of the subscribing witnesses that she appeared to know what she was
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doing at that time and that she was alone with
the lawyer when she made her wishes known,
since the Will itself shows she remembered who
were 'the natural objects of her bounty' and that
she disposed of her property 'understandingly
according to some plan formed in her mind.'
There being no question of fraud or undue influence in the formulating and relation of that
plan to the lawyer, the mere fact that at times
she was forgetful and eccentric and was weak
physically and that after she made her Will she
disposed of a good portion of her property after
a lifetime of careful saving is no proof that at
the time of making her Will she lacked testamentary capacity. The court therefore did not err in
admitting the \V"ill to probate in view of the
complete lack of evidence that at the time of
making the Will testatrix lacked the mind to
understand ".,.hat she 'Yas doing."
In the case of Rose r. Foster (Old.), 288 P. 2d 745
( 1955), the decedent "~as an elderly lady afflicted with
son1e ph~Tsical disability~ i.e.~ angina pectoris and Parkinson syndrome, "Thich disability seemed to progress ·with
age. She "Tas n1entally alert and the "~ll 'Yas drawn by
an attorne~~ according to her instructions. The Court
said:
"It has been held 1nanY tunes that advanced
age or physical infir1nity ~.lone does not render
one incapable of n1aking a will."
In the Oklnho1na case of Brou·n r. Broten, 28'7 P. 2d
D13 ( ln~'lG), it "Tas held that evidence of a testator's
ailing or \YPnkened physical condition is not proof in
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itself of his testamentary incapacity; that in order to constitute such proof the condition must be shown to have
rendered him incapable of understanding the nature and
consequences of his acts at the time he made the will.
The Court calls attention to counsel's adroit attempt to
show that the testator's paralytic condition made him
agreeable to anything that was suggested to him, but
that such attempt, when uncolored and "unclothed with
inference as they are portrayed in counsel's brief," was
unconvincing. In the instant case there is nothing but
age, a sick woman and Currier for the contestants to rely
upon. We have disposed of Currier and there leaves the
alert mind of an elderly and sick woman but not too ill
to say that she had made a mistake in her will and to
direct the rectifying of the same.
There is no competent evidence in the record that
reflects upon the integrity of what was done when ~liss
Richards executed her codicil on the 25th of June, 1954,
in the presence of Messrs. Jones, Carlson and Morten..
sen. At that time not only was she under the careful
observation of those men who witnessed the instrument,
but she was, by virtue of all the hospital attendance and
service ordered by her attending physician and interne,
also, in effect, under the surveillance of doctors. If indeed Miss Richards had lacked testamentary competence,
certainly some one of these highly competent and indisputedly honorable men would have said so in voice
louder and clearer than the feeble, vacillating, uncertain
\vhispers of Dr. Currier, who never saw or treated Miss
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Richards, and whose testimony is altogether without
force and probative value. Reasonable minds cannot
differ on the proposition that Miss Richards was not
in diabetic coma or insulin shock, or even approaching
those two extremes when the codicil was executed and
the intravenous feeding commenced. The experienced
witnesses to the document would have readily ascertained
such condition if one in fact existed, and without such
condition being present Miss Richards could function
and was competent by the testimony of Dr. Galligan.
Those who had the burden of showing incompetency
have failed to sustain it ; they do not contradict the
testimony or reflect upon the credibility of Messrs. Jones,
Carlson, ~Iortensen and Dr. Galligan by anything that
to the reasonable mind \vould be considered evidenee of
probative value.

The judg1nent of the trial court should be reversed
and the cause remanded

"~ith

instructions to admit the

codicil to probate consistent with the motion for directed
verdict ( Tr. 426) and the n1otion 1nade for judgn1ent
notwithstanding the verdict (Tr. 74).
Respectfully subn1itted,

GUSTIN, RICHARDS &

~IATTSSON

Attorneys for Appellant
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